604604a667
* update to 4.17.5 * changelog: https://www.samba.org/samba/history/samba-4.17.5 * refresh patch * CVE-2022-42898: Samba's Kerberos libraries and AD DC failed to guard against integer overflows when parsing a PAC on a 32-bit system, which allowed an attacker with a forged PAC to corrupt the heap. https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-42898.html * CVE-2022-37966: This is the Samba CVE for the Windows Kerberos RC4-HMAC Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability disclosed by Microsoft on Nov 8 2022. A Samba Active Directory DC will issue weak rc4-hmac session keys for use between modern clients and servers despite all modern Kerberos implementations supporting the aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 cipher. On Samba Active Directory DCs and members 'kerberos encryption types = legacy' would force rc4-hmac as a client even if the server supports aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 and/or aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96. https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-37966.html * CVE-2022-37967: This is the Samba CVE for the Windows Kerberos Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability disclosed by Microsoft on Nov 8 2022. A service account with the special constrained delegation permission could forge a more powerful ticket than the one it was presented with. https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-37967.html * CVE-2022-38023: The "RC4" protection of the NetLogon Secure channel uses the same algorithms as rc4-hmac cryptography in Kerberos, and so must also be assumed to be weak. https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-38023.html * BUG 15210: synthetic_pathref AFP_AfpInfo failed errors. This resolves errors logged during macOS TimeMachine backups. https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15210 Signed-off-by: Michael Peleshenko <mpeleshenko@gmail.com>
11 lines
333 B
Diff
11 lines
333 B
Diff
--- a/source4/lib/messaging/messaging.c
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+++ b/source4/lib/messaging/messaging.c
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@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ static struct imessaging_context *imessa
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goto fail;
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}
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- msg->sock_dir = lpcfg_private_path(msg, lp_ctx, "msg.sock");
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+ msg->sock_dir = lpcfg_lock_path(msg, lp_ctx, "msg.sock");
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if (msg->sock_dir == NULL) {
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goto fail;
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}
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