packages/net/haproxy/patches/0007-BUG-MAJOR-checks-always-check-for-end-of-list-before.patch
heil d5c18252d4 haproxy: add patches from upstream
- [PATCH 1/2] BUG/MEDIUM: stats: properly initialize the scope before
 - [PATCH 2/2] BUG/MEDIUM: http: don't forward client shutdown without
 - [PATCH 3/8] BUG/MINOR: check: fix tcpcheck error message
 - [PATCH 4/8] CLEANUP: checks: fix double usage of cur / current_step
 - [PATCH 5/8] BUG/MEDIUM: checks: do not dereference head of a
 - [PATCH 6/8] CLEANUP: checks: simplify the loop processing of
 - [PATCH 7/8] BUG/MAJOR: checks: always check for end of list before
 - [PATCH 8/8] BUG/MEDIUM: checks: do not dereference a list as a
 - [PATCH 09/10] BUG/MEDIUM: peers: apply a random reconnection timeout
 - [PATCH 10/10] DOC: Update doc about weight, act and bck fields in the
 - [PATCH 11/14] MINOR: ssl: add a destructor to free allocated SSL
 - [PATCH 12/14] BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: fix tune.ssl.default-dh-param value
 - [PATCH 13/14] BUG/MINOR: cfgparse: fix typo in 'option httplog' error
 - [PATCH 14/14] BUG/MEDIUM: cfgparse: segfault when userlist is misused

Signed-off-by: heil <heil@terminal-consulting.de>
2015-06-11 19:03:14 +02:00

90 lines
3.5 KiB
Diff

From 97fccc87f1297d189ee80735e5b8746c34956eda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 12:08:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] BUG/MAJOR: checks: always check for end of list before
proceeding
This is the most important fix of this series. There's a risk of endless
loop and crashes caused by the fact that we go past the head of the list
when skipping to next rule, without checking if it's still a valid element.
Most of the time, the ->action field is checked, which points to the proxy's
check_req pointer (generally NULL), meaning the element is confused with a
TCPCHK_ACT_SEND action.
The situation was accidently made worse with the addition of tcp-check
comment since it also skips list elements. However, since the action that
makes it go forward is TCPCHK_ACT_COMMENT (3), there's little chance to
see this as a valid pointer, except on 64-bit machines where it can match
the end of a check_req string pointer.
This fix heavily depends on previous cleanup and both must be backported
to 1.5 where the bug is present.
(cherry picked from commit f2c87353a7f8160930b5f342bb6d6ad0991ee3d1)
[wt: this patch differs significantly from 1.6 since we don't have comments]
---
src/cfgparse.c | 4 +++-
src/checks.c | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/cfgparse.c b/src/cfgparse.c
index 746c7eb..dba59d1 100644
--- a/src/cfgparse.c
+++ b/src/cfgparse.c
@@ -4368,7 +4368,9 @@ stats_error_parsing:
l = (struct list *)&curproxy->tcpcheck_rules;
if (l->p != l->n) {
tcpcheck = (struct tcpcheck_rule *)l->n;
- if (tcpcheck && tcpcheck->action != TCPCHK_ACT_CONNECT) {
+
+ if (&tcpcheck->list != &curproxy->tcpcheck_rules
+ && tcpcheck->action != TCPCHK_ACT_CONNECT) {
Alert("parsing [%s:%d] : first step MUST also be a 'connect' when there is a 'connect' step in the tcp-check ruleset.\n",
file, linenum);
err_code |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
diff --git a/src/checks.c b/src/checks.c
index a0c42f2..e13d561 100644
--- a/src/checks.c
+++ b/src/checks.c
@@ -2057,6 +2057,9 @@ static void tcpcheck_main(struct connection *conn)
/* allow next rule */
check->current_step = (struct tcpcheck_rule *)check->current_step->list.n;
+ if (&check->current_step->list == head)
+ break;
+
/* don't do anything until the connection is established */
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
/* update expire time, should be done by process_chk */
@@ -2110,6 +2113,9 @@ static void tcpcheck_main(struct connection *conn)
/* go to next rule and try to send */
check->current_step = (struct tcpcheck_rule *)check->current_step->list.n;
+
+ if (&check->current_step->list == head)
+ break;
} /* end 'send' */
else if (check->current_step->action == TCPCHK_ACT_EXPECT) {
if (unlikely(check->result == CHK_RES_FAILED))
@@ -2196,6 +2202,9 @@ static void tcpcheck_main(struct connection *conn)
/* allow next rule */
check->current_step = (struct tcpcheck_rule *)check->current_step->list.n;
+ if (&check->current_step->list == head)
+ break;
+
if (check->current_step->action == TCPCHK_ACT_EXPECT)
goto tcpcheck_expect;
__conn_data_stop_recv(conn);
@@ -2208,6 +2217,9 @@ static void tcpcheck_main(struct connection *conn)
/* allow next rule */
check->current_step = (struct tcpcheck_rule *)check->current_step->list.n;
+ if (&check->current_step->list == head)
+ break;
+
if (check->current_step->action == TCPCHK_ACT_EXPECT)
goto tcpcheck_expect;
__conn_data_stop_recv(conn);
--
2.0.5