diff --git a/lang/python/python-crypto/Makefile b/lang/python/python-crypto/Makefile
index 551fd94fa..ae1694a6a 100644
--- a/lang/python/python-crypto/Makefile
+++ b/lang/python/python-crypto/Makefile
@@ -9,16 +9,17 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=python-crypto
PKG_VERSION:=2.6.1
-PKG_RELEASE:=2
+PKG_RELEASE:=3
PKG_SOURCE:=pycrypto-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
-PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://ftp.dlitz.net/pub/dlitz/crypto/pycrypto/
+PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/p/pycrypto
PKG_HASH:=f2ce1e989b272cfcb677616763e0a2e7ec659effa67a88aa92b3a65528f60a3c
PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(BUILD_DIR)/$(BUILD_VARIANT)-crypto-$(PKG_VERSION)
PKG_LICENSE:=Public Domain
PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYRIGHT
+PKG_CPE_ID:=cpe:/a:dlitz:pycrypto
PKG_MAINTAINER:=Jeffery To <jeffery.to@gmail.com>
include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package.mk
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ define Package/python-crypto/Default
SECTION:=lang-python
CATEGORY:=Languages
SUBMENU:=Python
- URL:=http://www.pycrypto.org/
+ URL:=https://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto/
endef
define Package/python-crypto
diff --git a/lang/python/python-crypto/patches/100-CVE-2013-74459.patch b/lang/python/python-crypto/patches/100-CVE-2013-74459.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..db1f740b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lang/python/python-crypto/patches/100-CVE-2013-74459.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+From 8dbe0dc3eea5c689d4f76b37b93fe216cf1f00d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Legrandin <helderijs@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 22 Dec 2013 22:24:46 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Throw exception when IV is used with ECB or CTR
+
+The IV parameter is currently ignored when initializing
+a cipher in ECB or CTR mode.
+
+For CTR mode, it is confusing: it takes some time to see
+that a different parameter is needed (the counter).
+
+For ECB mode, it is outright dangerous.
+
+This patch forces an exception to be raised.
+---
+ lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ src/block_template.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py b/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py
+index 420b6ff..a5f8a88 100644
+--- a/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py
++++ b/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py
+@@ -239,16 +239,30 @@ class RoundtripTest(unittest.TestCase):
+ return """%s .decrypt() output of .encrypt() should not be garbled""" % (self.module_name,)
+
+ def runTest(self):
+- for mode in (self.module.MODE_ECB, self.module.MODE_CBC, self.module.MODE_CFB, self.module.MODE_OFB, self.module.MODE_OPENPGP):
++
++ ## ECB mode
++ mode = self.module.MODE_ECB
++ encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode)
++ ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext)
++ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode)
++ decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
++ self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext)
++
++ ## OPENPGP mode
++ mode = self.module.MODE_OPENPGP
++ encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv)
++ eiv_ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext)
++ eiv = eiv_ciphertext[:self.module.block_size+2]
++ ciphertext = eiv_ciphertext[self.module.block_size+2:]
++ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, eiv)
++ decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
++ self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext)
++
++ ## All other non-AEAD modes (but CTR)
++ for mode in (self.module.MODE_CBC, self.module.MODE_CFB, self.module.MODE_OFB):
+ encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv)
+ ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext)
+-
+- if mode != self.module.MODE_OPENPGP:
+- decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv)
+- else:
+- eiv = ciphertext[:self.module.block_size+2]
+- ciphertext = ciphertext[self.module.block_size+2:]
+- decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, eiv)
++ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv)
+ decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
+ self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext)
+
+diff --git a/src/block_template.c b/src/block_template.c
+index f940e0e..d555ceb 100644
+--- a/src/block_template.c
++++ b/src/block_template.c
+@@ -170,6 +170,17 @@ ALGnew(PyObject *self, PyObject *args, PyObject *kwdict)
+ "Key cannot be the null string");
+ return NULL;
+ }
++ if (IVlen != 0 && mode == MODE_ECB)
++ {
++ PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError, "ECB mode does not use IV");
++ return NULL;
++ }
++ if (IVlen != 0 && mode == MODE_CTR)
++ {
++ PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError,
++ "CTR mode needs counter parameter, not IV");
++ return NULL;
++ }
+ if (IVlen != BLOCK_SIZE && mode != MODE_ECB && mode != MODE_CTR)
+ {
+ PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError,
+From 58de28a5d32bc10e15766e5a59f41b07397cc6cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Mitchell <richard.j.mitchell@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 16:58:27 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix speedtest run for ECB modes.
+
+---
+ pct-speedtest.py | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/pct-speedtest.py b/pct-speedtest.py
+index 4ce18be..c7b893a 100644
+--- a/pct-speedtest.py
++++ b/pct-speedtest.py
+@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ class Benchmark:
+ blocks = self.random_blocks(16384, 1000)
+ if mode is None:
+ cipher = module.new(key)
++ elif mode==module.MODE_ECB:
++ cipher = module.new(key, module.MODE_ECB)
+ else:
+ cipher = module.new(key, mode, iv)
+
diff --git a/lang/python/python-crypto/patches/101-CVE-2018-6594.patch b/lang/python/python-crypto/patches/101-CVE-2018-6594.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..22c3719d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lang/python/python-crypto/patches/101-CVE-2018-6594.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+--- lib/Crypto/PublicKey/ElGamal.py
++++ lib/Crypto/PublicKey/ElGamal.py
+@@ -153,33 +153,33 @@ def generate(bits, randfunc, progress_fu
+ if number.isPrime(obj.p, randfunc=randfunc):
+ break
+ # Generate generator g
+- # See Algorithm 4.80 in Handbook of Applied Cryptography
+- # Note that the order of the group is n=p-1=2q, where q is prime
+ if progress_func:
+ progress_func('g\n')
+ while 1:
++ # Choose a square residue; it will generate a cyclic group of order q.
++ obj.g = pow(number.getRandomRange(2, obj.p, randfunc), 2, obj.p)
++
+ # We must avoid g=2 because of Bleichenbacher's attack described
+ # in "Generating ElGamal signatures without knowning the secret key",
+ # 1996
+- #
+- obj.g = number.getRandomRange(3, obj.p, randfunc)
+- safe = 1
+- if pow(obj.g, 2, obj.p)==1:
+- safe=0
+- if safe and pow(obj.g, q, obj.p)==1:
+- safe=0
++ if obj.g in (1, 2):
++ continue
++
+ # Discard g if it divides p-1 because of the attack described
+ # in Note 11.67 (iii) in HAC
+- if safe and divmod(obj.p-1, obj.g)[1]==0:
+- safe=0
++ if (obj.p - 1) % obj.g == 0:
++ continue
++
+ # g^{-1} must not divide p-1 because of Khadir's attack
+ # described in "Conditions of the generator for forging ElGamal
+ # signature", 2011
+ ginv = number.inverse(obj.g, obj.p)
+- if safe and divmod(obj.p-1, ginv)[1]==0:
+- safe=0
+- if safe:
+- break
++ if (obj.p - 1) % ginv == 0:
++ continue
++
++ # Found
++ break
++
+ # Generate private key x
+ if progress_func:
+ progress_func('x\n')