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Merge pull request #5807 from gladiac1337/feature-haproxy-v1.8.5

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Update HAProxy to v1.8.9
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Heil 2018-06-12 15:03:09 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit 970172eb12
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GPG key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
6 changed files with 36 additions and 307 deletions
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20
net/haproxy/Makefile
View file

@ -9,17 +9,21 @@
include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=haproxy
PKG_VERSION:=1.8.4
PKG_RELEASE:=01
PKG_VERSION:=1.8.9
PKG_RELEASE:=00
PKG_SOURCE:=haproxy-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/src/
PKG_HASH:=e305b0a4e7dec08072841eef6ac6dcd1b5586b1eff09c2d51e152a912e8884a6
PKG_HASH:=436b77927cd85bcd4c2cb3cbf7fb539a5362d9686fdcfa34f37550ca1f5db102
PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(BUILD_DIR)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(BUILD_VARIANT)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION)
PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0
MAINTAINER:=Thomas Heil <heil@terminal-consulting.de>
ifneq ($(PKG_RELEASE),00)
BUILD_VERSION:=-patch$(PKG_RELEASE)
endif
include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package.mk
define Package/haproxy/Default
@ -94,13 +98,6 @@ endef
ENABLE_LUA:=y
ENABLE_REGPARM:=n
ifeq ($(CONFIG_mips),y)
ENABLE_LUA:=n
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_mipsel),y)
ENABLE_LUA:=n
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_TARGET_x86),y)
ENABLE_REGPARM:=y
endif
@ -150,8 +147,9 @@ define Build/Compile
SMALL_OPTS="-DBUFSIZE=16384 -DMAXREWRITE=1030 -DSYSTEM_MAXCONN=165530 " \
USE_LINUX_TPROXY=1 USE_LINUX_SPLICE=1 USE_TFO=1 \
USE_ZLIB=yes USE_PCRE=1 USE_PCRE_JIT=1 USE_GETADDRINFO=1 \
VERSION="$(PKG_VERSION)-patch$(PKG_RELEASE)" \
VERSION="$(PKG_VERSION)$(BUILD_VERSION)" \
$(ADDON) \
CFLAGS="$(TARGET_CFLAGS)" \
LD="$(TARGET_CC)" \
LDFLAGS="$(TARGET_LDFLAGS) -latomic" \
IGNOREGIT=1

27
net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh Executable file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
#!/bin/bash
CLONEURL=http://git.haproxy.org/git/haproxy-1.8.git
BASE_TAG=v1.8.9
TMP_REPODIR=tmprepo
PATCHESDIR=patches
if test -d "${TMP_REPODIR}"; then rm -rf "${TMP_REPODIR}"; fi
git clone "${CLONEURL}" "${TMP_REPODIR}"
printf "Cleaning patches\n"
find ${PATCHESDIR} -type f -name "*.patch" -exec rm -f "{}" \;
i=0
for cid in $(git -C "${TMP_REPODIR}" rev-list ${BASE_TAG}..HEAD | tac); do
filename="$(printf "%04d" $i)-$(git -C "${TMP_REPODIR}" log --format=%s -n 1 $cid | sed -e"s/[()']//g" -e's/[^_a-zA-Z0-9+-]\+/-/g' -e's/-$//').patch"
printf "Creating ${filename}\n"
git -C "${TMP_REPODIR}" show $cid > "${PATCHESDIR}/$filename"
git add "${PATCHESDIR}/$filename"
let i++
done
rm -rf "${TMP_REPODIR}"
printf "finished\n"

61
net/haproxy/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-Dont-always-treat-SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL-as-unrecovarable.patch
View file

@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
From 2fcd544272a5498ffa49544e9f06b51bc93e55d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Houchard <ohouchard@haproxy.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 15:17:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Don't always treat SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL as
unrecovarable.
Bart Geesink reported some random errors appearing under the form of
termination flags SD in the logs for connections involving SSL traffic
to reach the servers.
Tomek Gacek and Mateusz Malek finally narrowed down the problem to commit
c2aae74 ("MEDIUM: ssl: Handle early data with OpenSSL 1.1.1"). It happens
that the special case of SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL isn't handled anymore since
this commit.
SSL_read() might return <= 0, and SSL_get_erro() return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL,
without meaning the connection is gone. Before flagging the connection
as in error, check the errno value.
This should be backported to 1.8.
(cherry picked from commit 7e2e505006feb8f3b4a7f9e0ac5e89b5a8c4895e)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/ssl_sock.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index aecf3dd..f118724 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -5437,6 +5437,12 @@ static int ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int coun
break;
} else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
goto read0;
+ /* For SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL, make sure the error is
+ * unrecoverable before flagging the connection as
+ * in error.
+ */
+ if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL && (!errno || errno == EAGAIN))
+ goto clear_ssl_error;
/* otherwise it's a real error */
goto out_error;
}
@@ -5451,11 +5457,12 @@ static int ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int coun
conn_sock_read0(conn);
goto leave;
out_error:
+ conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
+clear_ssl_error:
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
ERR_clear_error();
- conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
goto leave;
}
--
1.7.10.4

63
net/haproxy/patches/0002-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-Shutdown-the-connection-for-reading-on-SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL.patch
View file

@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
From f7fa1d461aa71bbc8a6c23fdcfc305f2e52ce5dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 14:25:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Shutdown the connection for reading on
SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
When SSL_read returns SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno is unset or set to EAGAIN, the
connection must be shut down for reading. Else, the connection loops infinitly,
consuming all the CPU.
The bug was introduced in the commit 7e2e50500 ("BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Don't always
treat SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL as unrecovarable."). This patch must be backported in
1.8 too.
(cherry picked from commit 4ac77a98cda3d0f9b1d9de7bbbda2c91357f0767)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/ssl_sock.c | 14 ++++++++------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index f118724..a065bbb 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -5437,10 +5437,9 @@ static int ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int coun
break;
} else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
goto read0;
- /* For SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL, make sure the error is
- * unrecoverable before flagging the connection as
- * in error.
- */
+ /* For SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL, make sure to clear the error
+ * stack before shutting down the connection for
+ * reading. */
if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL && (!errno || errno == EAGAIN))
goto clear_ssl_error;
/* otherwise it's a real error */
@@ -5453,16 +5452,19 @@ static int ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int coun
conn_cond_update_sock_polling(conn);
return done;
+ clear_ssl_error:
+ /* Clear openssl global errors stack */
+ ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
+ ERR_clear_error();
read0:
conn_sock_read0(conn);
goto leave;
+
out_error:
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
-clear_ssl_error:
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
ERR_clear_error();
-
goto leave;
}
--
1.7.10.4

69
net/haproxy/patches/0003-BUG-MEDIUM-http-Switch-the-HTTP-response-in-tunnel-mode-as-earlier-as-possible.patch
View file

@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
From 8a5949f2d74c3a3a6c6da25449992c312b183ef3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 15:54:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: http: Switch the HTTP response in tunnel mode as
earlier as possible
When the body length is undefined (no Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding
headers), The reponse remains in ending mode, waiting the request is done. So,
most of time this is not a problem because the resquest is done before the
response. But when a client sends data to a server that replies without waiting
all the data, it is really not desirable to wait the end of the request to
finish the response.
This bug was introduced when the tunneling of the request and the reponse was
refactored, in commit 4be980391 ("MINOR: http: Switch requests/responses in
TUNNEL mode only by checking txn flag").
This patch should be backported in 1.8 and 1.7.
(cherry picked from commit fd04fcf5edb0a24cd29ce8f4d4dc2aa3a0e2e82c)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/proto_http.c | 15 +++++----------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c
index 64bd410..29880ea 100644
--- a/src/proto_http.c
+++ b/src/proto_http.c
@@ -4634,16 +4634,8 @@ int http_sync_res_state(struct stream *s)
* let's enforce it now that we're not expecting any new
* data to come. The caller knows the stream is complete
* once both states are CLOSED.
- *
- * However, there is an exception if the response length
- * is undefined. In this case, we switch in TUNNEL mode.
*/
- if (!(txn->rsp.flags & HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN)) {
- channel_auto_read(chn);
- txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL;
- chn->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT;
- }
- else if (!(chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW))) {
+ if (!(chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW))) {
channel_shutr_now(chn);
channel_shutw_now(chn);
}
@@ -6241,6 +6233,8 @@ http_msg_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct http_msg *msg)
/* The server still sending data that should be filtered */
if (!(chn->flags & CF_SHUTR) && HAS_DATA_FILTERS(s, chn))
goto missing_data_or_waiting;
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL;
+ goto ending;
}
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ENDING;
@@ -6262,7 +6256,8 @@ http_msg_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct http_msg *msg)
/* default_ret */ 1,
/* on_error */ goto error,
/* on_wait */ goto waiting);
- msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_DONE;
+ if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ENDING)
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_DONE;
return 1;
missing_data_or_waiting:
--
1.7.10.4

103
net/haproxy/patches/0004-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-sample-ssl_bc_-fetch-keywords-are-broken.patch
View file

@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
From 7ccf7c9791f2b2329f3940d1347618af3a77bebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Emeric Brun <ebrun@haproxy.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 15:59:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: ssl/sample: ssl_bc_* fetch keywords are broken.
Since the split between connections and conn-stream objects, this
keywords are broken.
This patch must be backported in 1.8
(cherry picked from commit eb8def9f34c37537d56a69fcd211d4c4c8006bea)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/ssl_sock.c | 31 ++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index 4d0d5db..d832d76 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -6580,8 +6580,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_x_key_alg(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
smp->data.type = SMP_T_BOOL;
smp->data.u.sint = (conn && conn->xprt == &ssl_sock);
@@ -6625,8 +6625,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_fc_is_resumed(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const ch
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_cipher(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
smp->flags = 0;
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
@@ -6651,9 +6651,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_fc_cipher(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alg_keysize(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
-
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
int sint;
smp->flags = 0;
@@ -6676,8 +6675,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alg_keysize(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const c
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_use_keysize(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
smp->flags = 0;
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
@@ -6747,8 +6746,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alpn(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_protocol(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
smp->flags = 0;
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
@@ -6773,9 +6772,8 @@ static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_session_id(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090800fL
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
-
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
SSL_SESSION *ssl_sess;
smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST;
@@ -6917,9 +6915,8 @@ static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_unique_id(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090800fL
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
-
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
int finished_len;
struct chunk *finished_trash;
--
1.7.10.4