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Merge pull request #9904 from RussellSenior/my-18.06

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patch: cherry pick CVE fixes to 18.06 branch
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Rosen Penev 2019-09-02 00:13:59 -07:00 committed by GitHub
commit 7a7820fb15
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3 changed files with 147 additions and 1 deletions
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2
devel/patch/Makefile
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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=patch
PKG_VERSION:=2.7.6
PKG_RELEASE:=3
PKG_RELEASE:=5
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=@GNU/patch

108
devel/patch/patches/050-CVE-2019-13636.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
From dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:21:48 +0200
Subject: Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
* src/inp.c (plan_a, plan_b), src/util.c (copy_to_fd, copy_file,
append_to_file): Unless the --follow-symlinks option is given, open files with
the O_NOFOLLOW flag to avoid following symlinks. So far, we were only doing
that consistently for input files.
* src/util.c (create_backup): When creating empty backup files, (re)create them
with O_CREAT | O_EXCL to avoid following symlinks in that case as well.
---
src/inp.c | 12 ++++++++++--
src/util.c | 14 +++++++++++---
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/inp.c b/src/inp.c
index 32d0919..22d7473 100644
--- a/src/inp.c
+++ b/src/inp.c
@@ -238,8 +238,13 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
{
if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode))
{
- int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0);
+ int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
size_t buffered = 0, n;
+ int ifd;
+
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0);
if (ifd < 0)
pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
@@ -340,6 +345,7 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
static void
plan_b (char const *filename)
{
+ int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
int ifd;
FILE *ifp;
int c;
@@ -353,7 +359,9 @@ plan_b (char const *filename)
if (instat.st_size == 0)
filename = NULL_DEVICE;
- if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY | binary_transput, 0)) < 0
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0)) < 0
|| ! (ifp = fdopen (ifd, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r")))
pfatal ("Can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
if (TMPINNAME_needs_removal)
diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c
index 1cc08ba..fb38307 100644
--- a/src/util.c
+++ b/src/util.c
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ create_backup (char const *to, const struct stat *to_st, bool leave_original)
try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
safe_unlink (bakname);
- while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
+ while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
{
if (errno != try_makedirs_errno)
pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname));
@@ -579,10 +579,13 @@ create_file (char const *file, int open_flags, mode_t mode,
static void
copy_to_fd (const char *from, int tofd)
{
+ int from_flags = O_RDONLY | O_BINARY;
int fromfd;
ssize_t i;
- if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, 0)) < 0)
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ from_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, from_flags, 0)) < 0)
pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (from));
while ((i = read (fromfd, buf, bufsize)) != 0)
{
@@ -625,6 +628,8 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost,
else
{
assert (S_ISREG (mode));
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
tofd = create_file (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | to_flags, mode,
to_dir_known_to_exist);
copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
@@ -640,9 +645,12 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost,
void
append_to_file (char const *from, char const *to)
{
+ int to_flags = O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY;
int tofd;
- if ((tofd = safe_open (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | O_APPEND, 0)) < 0)
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ if ((tofd = safe_open (to, to_flags, 0)) < 0)
pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (to));
copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
if (close (tofd) != 0)
--
cgit v1.0-41-gc330

38
devel/patch/patches/060-CVE-2018-20969-CVE-2019-13638.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From 3fcd042d26d70856e826a42b5f93dc4854d80bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 19:36:15 +0200
Subject: Invoke ed directly instead of using the shell
* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Invoke ed directly instead of using a shell
command to avoid quoting vulnerabilities.
---
src/pch.c | 6 ++----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/pch.c b/src/pch.c
index 4fd5a05..16e001a 100644
--- a/src/pch.c
+++ b/src/pch.c
@@ -2459,9 +2459,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname,
*outname_needs_removal = true;
copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
}
- sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
- verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
- outname);
fflush (stdout);
pid = fork();
@@ -2470,7 +2467,8 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname,
else if (pid == 0)
{
dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
- execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
+ assert (outname[0] != '!' && outname[0] != '-');
+ execlp (editor_program, editor_program, "-", outname, (char *) NULL);
_exit (2);
}
else
--
cgit v1.0-41-gc330