haproxy: Update all patches for HAProxy v1.8.17

- Add new patches (see https://www.haproxy.org/bugs/bugs-1.8.17.html)
- Raise PKG_RELEASE to 2
- Prefix patches with 3-digit numbers instead of 4-digit numbers

Signed-off-by: Christian Lachner <gladiac@gmail.com>

net/haproxy/Makefile

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=haproxy
 PKG_VERSION:=1.8.17
-PKG_RELEASE:=1
+PKG_RELEASE:=2
 
 PKG_SOURCE:=haproxy-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/src/

net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ find ${PATCHESDIR} -type f -name "*.patch" -exec rm -f "{}" \;
 
 i=0
 for cid in $(git -C "${TMP_REPODIR}" rev-list ${BASE_TAG}..HEAD | tac); do
-	filename="$(printf "%04d" $i)-$(git -C "${TMP_REPODIR}" log --format=%s -n 1 $cid | sed -e"s/[()']//g" -e's/[^_a-zA-Z0-9+-]\+/-/g' -e's/-$//').patch"
+	filename="$(printf "%03d" $i)-$(git -C "${TMP_REPODIR}" log --format=%s -n 1 $cid | sed -e"s/[()']//g" -e's/[^_a-zA-Z0-9+-]\+/-/g' -e's/-$//').patch"
 	printf "Creating ${filename}\n"
 	git -C "${TMP_REPODIR}" show $cid > "${PATCHESDIR}/$filename"
 	git add "${PATCHESDIR}/$filename"

net/haproxy/patches/000-DOC-http-request-cache-use-http-response-cache-store-expects-cache-name.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+commit 6648ff0cccee04a6a0c0e64050151b5d6c5bac51
+Author: Jarno Huuskonen <jarno.huuskonen@uef.fi>
+Date:   Fri Jan 4 14:05:02 2019 +0200
+
+    DOC: http-request cache-use / http-response cache-store expects cache name
+    
+    Adds missing cache name option to http-request cache-use and
+    http-response cache-store documentation.
+    
+    Also adds optional if/unless condition to
+    10.2.2. Proxy section: http-request cache-use / http-response cache-store
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 251a6b72a8b6f0a4b167f6a2960e422d682aed80)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit 5376f6af9239fdf8a79b6c912387de12e3c9d6cd)
+    [wla: no http-request/response section in 1.8]
+    Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+
+diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
+index 4f999e25..712e56e2 100644
+--- a/doc/configuration.txt
++++ b/doc/configuration.txt
+@@ -17157,13 +17157,13 @@ max-age <seconds>
+ 10.2.2. Proxy section
+ ---------------------
+ 
+-http-request cache-use <name>
++http-request cache-use <name> [ { if | unless } <condition> ]
+   Try to deliver a cached object from the cache <name>. This directive is also
+   mandatory to store the cache as it calculates the cache hash. If you want to
+   use a condition for both storage and delivering that's a good idea to put it
+   after this one.
+ 
+-http-response cache-store <name>
++http-response cache-store <name> [ { if | unless } <condition> ]
+   Store an http-response within the cache. The storage of the response headers
+   is done at this step, which means you can use others http-response actions
+   to modify headers before or after the storage of the response. This action

net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MAJOR-cache-fix-confusion-between-zero-and-uninitialized-cache-key.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+commit a64e5574e40e3e0819c82e35a7e3d2fa65febc73
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date:   Fri Jan 11 19:38:25 2019 +0100
+
+    BUG/MAJOR: cache: fix confusion between zero and uninitialized cache key
+    
+    The cache uses the first 32 bits of the uri's hash as the key to reference
+    the object in the cache. It makes a special case of the value zero to mean
+    that the object is not in the cache anymore. The problem is that when an
+    object hashes as zero, it's still inserted but the eb32_delete() call is
+    skipped, resulting in the object still being chained in the memory area
+    while the block has been reclaimed and used for something else. Then when
+    objects which were chained below it (techically any object since zero is
+    at the root) are deleted, the walk through the upper object may encounter
+    corrupted values where valid pointers were expected.
+    
+    But while this should only happen statically once on 4 billion, the problem
+    gets worse when the cache-use conditions don't match the cache-store ones,
+    because cache-store runs with an uninitialized key, which can create objects
+    that will never be found by the lookup code, or worse, entries with a zero
+    key preventing eviction of the tree node and resulting in a crash. It's easy
+    to accidently end up on such a config because the request rules generally
+    can't be used to decide on the response :
+    
+      http-request  cache-use cache   if { path_beg /images }
+      http-response cache-store cache
+    
+    In this test, mixing traffic with /images/$RANDOM and /foo/$RANDOM will
+    result in random keys being inserted, some of them possibly being zero,
+    and crashes will quickly happen.
+    
+    The fix consists in 1) always initializing the transaction's cache_hash
+    to zero, and 2) never storing a response for which the hash has not been
+    calculated, as indicated by the value zero.
+    
+    It is worth noting that objects hashing as value zero will never be cached,
+    but given that there's only one chance among 4 billion that this happens,
+    this is totally harmless.
+    
+    This fix must be backported to 1.9 and 1.8.
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit c9036c00044a8d81561113886ecec9a9ce71bd3b)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit 5a6279fcc16da479304bcabc1705e8653f274337)
+    Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+
+diff --git a/src/cache.c b/src/cache.c
+index 667cede3..3d8ed241 100644
+--- a/src/cache.c
++++ b/src/cache.c
+@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ enum act_return http_action_store_cache(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px,
+ 	struct cache *cache = (struct cache *)rule->arg.act.p[0];
+ 	struct shared_context *shctx = shctx_ptr(cache);
+ 	struct cache_entry *object;
+-
++	unsigned int key = *(unsigned int *)txn->cache_hash;
+ 
+ 	/* Don't cache if the response came from a cache */
+ 	if ((obj_type(s->target) == OBJ_TYPE_APPLET) &&
+@@ -420,6 +420,10 @@ enum act_return http_action_store_cache(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px,
+ 	if (txn->meth != HTTP_METH_GET)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++	/* cache key was not computed */
++	if (!key)
++		goto out;
++
+ 	/* cache only 200 status code */
+ 	if (txn->status != 200)
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -478,7 +482,7 @@ enum act_return http_action_store_cache(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px,
+ 
+ 					cache_ctx->first_block = first;
+ 
+-					object->eb.key = (*(unsigned int *)&txn->cache_hash);
++					object->eb.key = key;
+ 					memcpy(object->hash, txn->cache_hash, sizeof(object->hash));
+ 					/* Insert the node later on caching success */
+ 
+diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c
+index 7e4a8351..29a1083a 100644
+--- a/src/proto_http.c
++++ b/src/proto_http.c
+@@ -8210,6 +8210,7 @@ void http_init_txn(struct stream *s)
+ 
+ 	txn->flags = 0;
+ 	txn->status = -1;
++	*(unsigned int *)txn->cache_hash = 0;
+ 
+ 	txn->cookie_first_date = 0;
+ 	txn->cookie_last_date = 0;

net/haproxy/patches/002-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-Disable-anti-replay-protection-and-set-max-data-with-0RTT.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+commit 9f01534cd68de78c74b50d7b8def07a72c2a3b49
+Author: Olivier Houchard <ohouchard@haproxy.com>
+Date:   Wed Jan 2 18:46:41 2019 +0100
+
+    BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Disable anti-replay protection and set max data with 0RTT.
+    
+    When using early data, disable the OpenSSL anti-replay protection, and set
+    the max amount of early data we're ready to accept, based on the size of
+    buffers, or early data won't work with the released OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+    
+    This should be backported to 1.8.
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 51088ce68fee0bae52118d6823873417046f9efe)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit 6703b633078b6bae12395ee3e310427b37965d68)
+    Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+
+diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
+index 24ccc4b1..11655533 100644
+--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
++++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
+@@ -3821,6 +3821,10 @@ ssl_sock_initial_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
+ 	SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk);
+ 	SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_err_cbk);
+ #elif (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L)
++	if (bind_conf->ssl_conf.early_data) {
++		SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY);
++		SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data(ctx, global.tune.bufsize - global.tune.maxrewrite);
++	}
+ 	SSL_CTX_set_client_hello_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk, NULL);
+ 	SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_err_cbk);
+ #else

net/haproxy/patches/003-DOC-Be-a-bit-more-explicit-about-allow-0rtt-security-implications.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+commit aca7e5aed7e036489ccc83d925103e94653b8670
+Author: Olivier Houchard <ohouchard@haproxy.com>
+Date:   Tue Jan 8 15:35:32 2019 +0100
+
+    DOC: Be a bit more explicit about allow-0rtt security implications.
+    
+    Document a bit better than allow-0rtt can trivially be used for replay attacks,
+    and so should only be used when it's safe to replay a request.
+    
+    This should probably be backported to 1.8 and 1.9.
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 69752964944ef9c8dc03477ee95bc7d149a72089)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit bb0df71201ad5b2d0cec514773d244275e5240df)
+    Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+
+diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
+index 712e56e2..72b769a4 100644
+--- a/doc/configuration.txt
++++ b/doc/configuration.txt
+@@ -10483,7 +10483,10 @@ accept-proxy
+ 
+ allow-0rtt
+   Allow receiving early data when using TLSv1.3. This is disabled by default,
+-  due to security considerations.
++  due to security considerations. Because it is vulnerable to replay attacks,
++  you should only allow if for requests that are safe to replay, ie requests
++  that are idempotent. You can use the "wait-for-handshake" action for any
++  request that wouldn't be safe with early data.
+ 
+ alpn <protocols>
+   This enables the TLS ALPN extension and advertises the specified protocol

net/haproxy/patches/004-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-missing-allocation-failure-checks-loading-tls-key-file.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+commit 30cd01cbfd40201f3abe246216a85c69352aa79c
+Author: Emeric Brun <ebrun@haproxy.com>
+Date:   Thu Jan 10 10:51:13 2019 +0100
+
+    BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: missing allocation failure checks loading tls key file
+    
+    This patch fixes missing allocation checks loading tls key file
+    and avoid memory leak in some error cases.
+    
+    This patch should be backport on branches 1.9 and 1.8
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 09852f70e0ed0f23cf9287b1ce55bb6a60112f32)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit a1dc55a63cfbc8f440b72b6def3957bf1fad12b2)
+    Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+
+diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
+index 11655533..7884c411 100644
+--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
++++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
+@@ -7627,15 +7627,36 @@ static int bind_parse_tls_ticket_keys(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	keys_ref = malloc(sizeof(*keys_ref));
++	if (!keys_ref) {
++		if (err)
++			 memprintf(err, "'%s' : allocation error", args[cur_arg+1]);
++		return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
++	}
++
+ 	keys_ref->tlskeys = malloc(TLS_TICKETS_NO * sizeof(struct tls_sess_key));
++	if (!keys_ref->tlskeys) {
++		free(keys_ref);
++		if (err)
++			 memprintf(err, "'%s' : allocation error", args[cur_arg+1]);
++		return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if ((f = fopen(args[cur_arg + 1], "r")) == NULL) {
++		free(keys_ref->tlskeys);
++		free(keys_ref);
+ 		if (err)
+ 			memprintf(err, "'%s' : unable to load ssl tickets keys file", args[cur_arg+1]);
+ 		return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	keys_ref->filename = strdup(args[cur_arg + 1]);
++	if (!keys_ref->filename) {
++		free(keys_ref->tlskeys);
++		free(keys_ref);
++		if (err)
++			 memprintf(err, "'%s' : allocation error", args[cur_arg+1]);
++		return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
++	}
+ 
+ 	while (fgets(thisline, sizeof(thisline), f) != NULL) {
+ 		int len = strlen(thisline);
+@@ -7647,6 +7668,9 @@ static int bind_parse_tls_ticket_keys(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px
+ 			thisline[--len] = 0;
+ 
+ 		if (base64dec(thisline, len, (char *) (keys_ref->tlskeys + i % TLS_TICKETS_NO), sizeof(struct tls_sess_key)) != sizeof(struct tls_sess_key)) {
++			free(keys_ref->filename);
++			free(keys_ref->tlskeys);
++			free(keys_ref);
+ 			if (err)
+ 				memprintf(err, "'%s' : unable to decode base64 key on line %d", args[cur_arg+1], i + 1);
+ 			fclose(f);
+@@ -7656,6 +7680,9 @@ static int bind_parse_tls_ticket_keys(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (i < TLS_TICKETS_NO) {
++		free(keys_ref->filename);
++		free(keys_ref->tlskeys);
++		free(keys_ref);
+ 		if (err)
+ 			memprintf(err, "'%s' : please supply at least %d keys in the tls-tickets-file", args[cur_arg+1], TLS_TICKETS_NO);
+ 		fclose(f);

net/haproxy/patches/005-BUG-MINOR-backend-dont-use-url_param_name-as-a-hint-for-BE_LB_ALGO_PH.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+commit 98f9549fa466e3b73a04f17dbc05fd88427c72f4
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date:   Mon Jan 14 15:17:46 2019 +0100
+
+    BUG/MINOR: backend: don't use url_param_name as a hint for BE_LB_ALGO_PH
+    
+    At a few places in the code we used to rely on this variable to guess
+    what LB algo was in place. This is wrong because if the defaults section
+    presets "balance url_param foo" and a backend uses "balance roundrobin",
+    these locations will still see this url_param_name set and consider it.
+    The harm is limited, as this only causes the beginning of the request
+    body to be buffered. And in general this is a bad practice which prevents
+    us from cleaning the lbprm stuff. Let's explicitly check the LB algo
+    instead.
+    
+    This may be backported to all currently maintained versions.
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 089eaa0ba73913187e93d52c3ea34faa01fd8f9c)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit 70d1744bb41daab4110071e4855504b6dc47bda9)
+    [wla: no htx in 1.8]
+    Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+
+diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c
+index 29a1083a..5dc562ff 100644
+--- a/src/proto_http.c
++++ b/src/proto_http.c
+@@ -3935,7 +3935,8 @@ int http_process_request(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
+ 	 * that parameter. This will be done in another analyser.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (!(s->flags & (SF_ASSIGNED|SF_DIRECT)) &&
+-	    s->txn->meth == HTTP_METH_POST && s->be->url_param_name != NULL &&
++	    s->txn->meth == HTTP_METH_POST &&
++	    (s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_ALGO) == BE_LB_ALGO_PH &&
+ 	    (msg->flags & (HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN|HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK))) {
+ 		channel_dont_connect(req);
+ 		req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_BODY;

net/haproxy/patches/006-BUG-MINOR-backend-balance-uri-specific-options-were-lost-across-defaults.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+commit a5027f804144536f79829443b33e6c19c32b690a
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date:   Mon Jan 14 16:29:52 2019 +0100
+
+    BUG/MINOR: backend: balance uri specific options were lost across defaults
+    
+    The "balance uri" options "whole", "len" and "depth" were not properly
+    inherited from the defaults sections. In addition, "whole" and "len"
+    were not even reset when parsing "uri", meaning that 2 subsequent
+    "balance uri" statements would not have the expected effect as the
+    options from the first one would remain for the second one.
+    
+    This may be backported to all maintained versions.
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 602a499da5e81d6b4cfe8410f0fc6d53c1e06745)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit f00758fde5961e3bebc508852faeee4d9d80b0e0)
+    [wla: cfg_parse_listen() is still in cfgparse.c in 1.8]
+    Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+
+diff --git a/src/backend.c b/src/backend.c
+index 87327f19..4c4044a6 100644
+--- a/src/backend.c
++++ b/src/backend.c
+@@ -1516,6 +1516,8 @@ int backend_parse_balance(const char **args, char **err, struct proxy *curproxy)
+ 		curproxy->lbprm.algo |= BE_LB_ALGO_UH;
+ 
+ 		curproxy->uri_whole = 0;
++		curproxy->uri_len_limit = 0;
++		curproxy->uri_dirs_depth1 = 0;
+ 
+ 		while (*args[arg]) {
+ 			if (!strcmp(args[arg], "len")) {
+diff --git a/src/cfgparse.c b/src/cfgparse.c
+index 94f29637..91bb802e 100644
+--- a/src/cfgparse.c
++++ b/src/cfgparse.c
+@@ -2844,7 +2844,10 @@ int cfg_parse_listen(const char *file, int linenum, char **args, int kwm)
+ 
+ 			if (defproxy.url_param_name)
+ 				curproxy->url_param_name = strdup(defproxy.url_param_name);
+-			curproxy->url_param_len = defproxy.url_param_len;
++			curproxy->url_param_len   = defproxy.url_param_len;
++			curproxy->uri_whole       = defproxy.uri_whole;
++			curproxy->uri_len_limit   = defproxy.uri_len_limit;
++			curproxy->uri_dirs_depth1 = defproxy.uri_dirs_depth1;
+ 
+ 			if (defproxy.hh_name)
+ 				curproxy->hh_name = strdup(defproxy.hh_name);

net/haproxy/patches/007-BUG-MINOR-backend-BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE-is-a-value-not-a-bit.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+commit 7c6a6149a91d2e240a5a63f981c5d07d681df725
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date:   Mon Jan 14 17:07:39 2019 +0100
+
+    BUG/MINOR: backend: BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE is a value, not a bit
+    
+    There are a few instances where the lookup algo is tested against
+    BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE using a binary "AND" operation while this macro
+    is a value among a set, and not a bit. The test happens to work
+    because the value is exactly 4 and no bit overlaps with the other
+    possible values but this is a latent bug waiting for a new LB algo
+    to appear to strike. At the moment the only other algo sharing a bit
+    with it is the "first" algo which is never supported in the same code
+    places.
+    
+    This fix should be backported to maintained versions for safety if it
+    passes easily, otherwise it's not important as it will not fix any
+    visible issue.
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 6c30be52da3d949a8dd6fb5e2de7319c031e656e)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit 48147c424680b7e887fb176662d58d87baa16098)
+    Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+
+diff --git a/src/backend.c b/src/backend.c
+index 4c4044a6..0cf14cfd 100644
+--- a/src/backend.c
++++ b/src/backend.c
+@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_sh(struct proxy *px, const char *addr, int len,
+ 	if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
+ 		h = full_hash(h);
+  hash_done:
+-	if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
++	if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ 		return chash_get_server_hash(px, h, avoid);
+ 	else
+ 		return map_get_server_hash(px, h);
+@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_uh(struct proxy *px, char *uri, int uri_len, co
+ 	if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
+ 		hash = full_hash(hash);
+  hash_done:
+-	if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
++	if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ 		return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
+ 	else
+ 		return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
+@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_ph(struct proxy *px, const char *uri, int uri_l
+ 				if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
+ 					hash = full_hash(hash);
+ 
+-				if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
++				if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ 					return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
+ 				else
+ 					return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
+@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_ph_post(struct stream *s, const struct server *
+ 				if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
+ 					hash = full_hash(hash);
+ 
+-				if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
++				if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ 					return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
+ 				else
+ 					return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
+@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_hh(struct stream *s, const struct server *avoid
+ 	if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
+ 		hash = full_hash(hash);
+  hash_done:
+-	if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
++	if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ 		return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
+ 	else
+ 		return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
+@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_rch(struct stream *s, const struct server *avoi
+ 	if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
+ 		hash = full_hash(hash);
+  hash_done:
+-	if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
++	if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ 		return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
+ 	else
+ 		return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
+@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ int assign_server(struct stream *s)
+ 		case BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE:
+ 		case BE_LB_LKUP_MAP:
+ 			if ((s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_KIND) == BE_LB_KIND_RR) {
+-				if (s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
++				if ((s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ 					srv = chash_get_next_server(s->be, prev_srv);
+ 				else
+ 					srv = map_get_server_rr(s->be, prev_srv);
+@@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ int assign_server(struct stream *s)
+ 			 * back to round robin on the map.
+ 			 */
+ 			if (!srv) {
+-				if (s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
++				if ((s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
+ 					srv = chash_get_next_server(s->be, prev_srv);
+ 				else
+ 					srv = map_get_server_rr(s->be, prev_srv);

net/haproxy/patches/008-BUG-MINOR-stick_table-Prevent-conn_cur-from-underflowing.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+commit 93b3994091b5bd17b43c9d91ecae470d33157e25
+Author: Tim Duesterhus <tim@bastelstu.be>
+Date:   Fri Jan 4 00:11:59 2019 +0100
+
+    BUG/MINOR: stick_table: Prevent conn_cur from underflowing
+    
+    When using the peers feature a race condition could prevent
+    a connection from being properly counted. When this connection
+    exits it is being "uncounted" nonetheless, leading to a possible
+    underflow (-1) of the conn_curr stick table entry in the following
+    scenario :
+    
+      - Connect to peer A     (A=1, B=0)
+      - Peer A sends 1 to B   (A=1, B=1)
+      - Kill connection to A  (A=0, B=1)
+      - Connect to peer B     (A=0, B=2)
+      - Peer A sends 0 to B   (A=0, B=0)
+      - Peer B sends 0/2 to A (A=?, B=0)
+      - Kill connection to B  (A=?, B=-1)
+      - Peer B sends -1 to A  (A=-1, B=-1)
+    
+    This fix may be backported to all supported branches.
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 8b87c01c4d59247d9fb51a38cd12d5d94324b6a4)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit 4ceecc8a4ee6f46f20c7729056e14af5a8757121)
+    Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+
+diff --git a/include/proto/session.h b/include/proto/session.h
+index f48c0d4f..7265f5a7 100644
+--- a/include/proto/session.h
++++ b/include/proto/session.h
+@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ static inline void session_store_counters(struct session *sess)
+ 		if (ptr) {
+ 			HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
+ 
+-			stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
++			if (stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur) > 0)
++				stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
+ 
+ 			HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
+ 
+diff --git a/include/proto/stream.h b/include/proto/stream.h
+index 8521957e..c9bcac37 100644
+--- a/include/proto/stream.h
++++ b/include/proto/stream.h
+@@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ static inline void stream_store_counters(struct stream *s)
+ 		if (ptr) {
+ 			HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
+ 
+-			stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
++			if (stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur) > 0)
++				stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
+ 
+ 			HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
+ 
+@@ -142,7 +143,8 @@ static inline void stream_stop_content_counters(struct stream *s)
+ 		if (ptr) {
+ 			HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
+ 
+-			stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
++			if (stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur) > 0)
++				stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
+ 
+ 			HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
+ 

net/haproxy/patches/009-BUG-MINOR-server-dont-always-trust-srv_check_health-when-loading-a-server-state.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+commit 1c95076d881b7508a8d0819b1cfd642e364b255c
+Author: Jérôme Magnin <jmagnin@haproxy.com>
+Date:   Sun Jan 20 11:27:40 2019 +0100
+
+    BUG/MINOR: server: don't always trust srv_check_health when loading a server state
+    
+    When we load health values from a server state file, make sure what we assign
+    to srv->check.health actually matches the state we restore.
+    
+    This should be backported as far as 1.6.
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit f57afa453a685cfd92b7a27ef6e6035cb384ff57)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit 75455a0b78ce4ac723698df26c014b38467843b1)
+    Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+
+diff --git a/src/server.c b/src/server.c
+index a86db3db..28414780 100644
+--- a/src/server.c
++++ b/src/server.c
+@@ -2843,16 +2843,37 @@ static void srv_update_state(struct server *srv, int version, char **params)
+ 			HA_SPIN_LOCK(SERVER_LOCK, &srv->lock);
+ 			/* recover operational state and apply it to this server
+ 			 * and all servers tracking this one */
++			srv->check.health = srv_check_health;
+ 			switch (srv_op_state) {
+ 				case SRV_ST_STOPPED:
+ 					srv->check.health = 0;
+ 					srv_set_stopped(srv, "changed from server-state after a reload", NULL);
+ 					break;
+ 				case SRV_ST_STARTING:
++					/* If rise == 1 there is no STARTING state, let's switch to
++					 * RUNNING
++					 */
++					if (srv->check.rise == 1) {
++						srv->check.health = srv->check.rise + srv->check.fall - 1;
++						srv_set_running(srv, "", NULL);
++						break;
++					}
++					if (srv->check.health < 1 || srv->check.health >= srv->check.rise)
++						srv->check.health = srv->check.rise - 1;
+ 					srv->next_state = srv_op_state;
+ 					break;
+ 				case SRV_ST_STOPPING:
+-					srv->check.health = srv->check.rise + srv->check.fall - 1;
++					/* If fall == 1 there is no STOPPING state, let's switch to
++					 * STOPPED
++					 */
++					if (srv->check.fall == 1) {
++						srv->check.health = 0;
++						srv_set_stopped(srv, "changed from server-state after a reload", NULL);
++						break;
++					}
++					if (srv->check.health < srv->check.rise ||
++					    srv->check.health > srv->check.rise + srv->check.fall - 2)
++						srv->check.health = srv->check.rise;
+ 					srv_set_stopping(srv, "changed from server-state after a reload", NULL);
+ 					break;
+ 				case SRV_ST_RUNNING:
+@@ -2906,7 +2927,6 @@ static void srv_update_state(struct server *srv, int version, char **params)
+ 			srv->last_change = date.tv_sec - srv_last_time_change;
+ 			srv->check.status = srv_check_status;
+ 			srv->check.result = srv_check_result;
+-			srv->check.health = srv_check_health;
+ 
+ 			/* Only case we want to apply is removing ENABLED flag which could have been
+ 			 * done by the "disable health" command over the stats socket

net/haproxy/patches/010-BUG-MINOR-check-Wake-the-check-task-if-the-check-is-finished-in-wake_srv_chk.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+commit 7a74ffef9f356304b46ab862858cead85d451b5f
+Author: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
+Date:   Mon Jan 21 14:15:50 2019 +0100
+
+    BUG/MINOR: check: Wake the check task if the check is finished in wake_srv_chk()
+    
+    With tcp-check, the result of the check is set by the function tcpcheck_main()
+    from the I/O layer. So it is important to wake up the check task to handle the
+    result and finish the check. Otherwise, we will wait the task timeout to handle
+    the result of a tcp-check, delaying the next check by as much.
+    
+    This patch also fixes a problem about email alerts reported by PiBa-NL (Pieter)
+    on the ML [1] on all versions since the 1.6. So this patch must be backported
+    from 1.9 to 1.6.
+    
+    [1] https://www.mail-archive.com/haproxy@formilux.org/msg32190.html
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 774c486cece942570b6a9d16afe236a16ee12079)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit 3722dfbbfadf8f83f82feb3e67fbe482a5c94840)
+    Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+
+diff --git a/src/checks.c b/src/checks.c
+index 74958b2d..e04f1146 100644
+--- a/src/checks.c
++++ b/src/checks.c
+@@ -1403,12 +1403,13 @@ static int wake_srv_chk(struct conn_stream *cs)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (check->result != CHK_RES_UNKNOWN) {
+-		/* We're here because nobody wants to handle the error, so we
+-		 * sure want to abort the hard way.
+-		 */
++		/* Check complete or aborted. If connection not yet closed do it
++		 * now and wake the check task up to be sure the result is
++		 * handled ASAP. */
+ 		conn_sock_drain(conn);
+ 		cs_close(cs);
+ 		ret = -1;
++		task_wakeup(check->task, TASK_WOKEN_IO);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(SERVER_LOCK, &check->server->lock);

net/haproxy/patches/011-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-Fix-handling-of-TLS-1-3-KeyUpdate-messages.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+commit b68a427a236e7b9b0cf8b1c4a5360d960cdf9458
+Author: Dirkjan Bussink <d.bussink@gmail.com>
+Date:   Mon Jan 21 09:35:03 2019 -0800
+
+    BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Fix handling of TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate messages
+    
+    In OpenSSL 1.1.1 TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate messages will trigger the callback
+    that is used to verify renegotiation is disabled. This means that these
+    KeyUpdate messages fail. In OpenSSL 1.1.1 a better mechanism is
+    available with the SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION flag that disables any TLS
+    1.2 and earlier negotiation.
+    
+    So if this SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION flag is available, instead of having
+    a manual check, trust OpenSSL and disable the check. This means that TLS
+    1.3 KeyUpdate messages will work properly.
+    
+    Reported-By: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
+    (cherry picked from commit 526894ff3925d272c13e57926aa6b5d9d8ed5ee3)
+    [wt: gh issue #24; Needs to be backported till 1.8]
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit 062c5a190d50c4aa9c5bde88c8c5c85c5f15fc7b)
+    Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+
+diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
+index 7884c411..7736c324 100644
+--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
++++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
+@@ -1406,6 +1406,10 @@ void ssl_sock_infocbk(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret)
+ 	BIO *write_bio;
+ 	(void)ret; /* shut gcc stupid warning */
+ 
++#ifndef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
++	/* Please note that BoringSSL defines this macro to zero so don't
++	 * change this to #if and do not assign a default value to this macro!
++	 */
+ 	if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) {
+ 		/* Disable renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) */
+ 		if ((conn->flags & (CO_FL_CONNECTED | CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS | CO_FL_EARLY_DATA)) == CO_FL_CONNECTED) {
+@@ -1413,6 +1417,7 @@ void ssl_sock_infocbk(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret)
+ 			conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_RENEG;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++#endif
+ 
+ 	if ((where & SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) == SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) {
+ 		if (!(conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_16K_WBFSIZE)) {
+@@ -3806,6 +3811,11 @@ ssl_sock_initial_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
+ 		options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+ 	if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_PREF_CLIE_CIPH)
+ 		options &= ~SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
++
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
++	options |= SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
++#endif
++
+ 	SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, options);
+ 
+ #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC)

net/haproxy/patches/012-DOC-mention-the-effect-of-nf_conntrack_tcp_loose-on-src-dst.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+commit 2e405726a0c6be6617905522bde9038f75e623c4
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date:   Wed Jan 23 10:02:15 2019 +0100
+
+    DOC: mention the effect of nf_conntrack_tcp_loose on src/dst
+    
+    On rare occasions the logs may report inverted src/dst when using
+    conntrack with this sysctl. Add a mention for it in the doc. More
+    info here :
+    
+         https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg544878.html
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 64ded3db2c686bad582cf9bb9fcabf21cb4becb7)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit 037f9ac4a2cc4b344859af1cff7b30d5ecabe9e0)
+    Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+
+diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
+index 72b769a4..bc8ae4f8 100644
+--- a/doc/configuration.txt
++++ b/doc/configuration.txt
+@@ -13822,7 +13822,12 @@ dst : ip
+   which is the address the client connected to. It can be useful when running
+   in transparent mode. It is of type IP and works on both IPv4 and IPv6 tables.
+   On IPv6 tables, IPv4 address is mapped to its IPv6 equivalent, according to
+-  RFC 4291.
++  RFC 4291. When the incoming connection passed through address translation or
++  redirection involving connection tracking, the original destination address
++  before the redirection will be reported. On Linux systems, the source and
++  destination may seldom appear reversed if the nf_conntrack_tcp_loose sysctl
++  is set, because a late response may reopen a timed out connection and switch
++  what is believed to be the source and the destination.
+ 
+ dst_conn : integer
+   Returns an integer value corresponding to the number of currently established
+@@ -14127,7 +14132,13 @@ src : ip
+   behind a proxy. However if the "accept-proxy" or "accept-netscaler-cip" bind
+   directive is used, it can be the address of a client behind another
+   PROXY-protocol compatible component for all rule sets except
+-  "tcp-request connection" which sees the real address.
++  "tcp-request connection" which sees the real address. When the incoming
++  connection passed through address translation or redirection involving
++  connection tracking, the original destination address before the redirection
++  will be reported. On Linux systems, the source and destination may seldom
++  appear reversed if the nf_conntrack_tcp_loose sysctl is set, because a late
++  response may reopen a timed out connection and switch what is believed to be
++  the source and the destination.
+ 
+   Example:
+        # add an HTTP header in requests with the originating address' country

net/haproxy/patches/013-deprecated-openssl.patch

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  
  static HA_RWLOCK_T *ssl_rwlocks;
  
-@@ -1711,8 +1723,8 @@ ssl_sock_do_create_cert(const char *servername, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL
+@@ -1716,8 +1728,8 @@ ssl_sock_do_create_cert(const char *servername, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL
  	ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(newcrt), HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&ssl_ctx_serial, 1));
  
  	/* Set duration for the certificate */
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
  		goto mkcert_error;
  
  	/* set public key in the certificate */
-@@ -6285,7 +6297,7 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_x_notafter(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char
+@@ -6299,7 +6311,7 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_x_notafter(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char
  		goto out;
  
  	smp_trash = get_trash_chunk();
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
  		goto out;
  
  	smp->data.u.str = *smp_trash;
-@@ -6385,7 +6397,7 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_x_notbefore(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char
+@@ -6399,7 +6411,7 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_x_notbefore(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char
  		goto out;
  
  	smp_trash = get_trash_chunk();
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
  		goto out;
  
  	smp->data.u.str = *smp_trash;
-@@ -8935,10 +8947,12 @@ static void __ssl_sock_init(void)
+@@ -8976,10 +8988,12 @@ static void __ssl_sock_init(void)
  #endif
  
  	xprt_register(XPRT_SSL, &ssl_sock);
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
  	ssl_locking_init();
  #endif
  #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
-@@ -8967,8 +8981,8 @@ static void __ssl_sock_init(void)
+@@ -9008,8 +9022,8 @@ static void __ssl_sock_init(void)
  #else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
  	        OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
  		"\nRunning on OpenSSL version : %s%s",
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@
  #endif
  	memprintf(&ptr, "%s\nOpenSSL library supports TLS extensions : "
  #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
-@@ -9059,12 +9073,14 @@ static void __ssl_sock_deinit(void)
+@@ -9100,12 +9114,14 @@ static void __ssl_sock_deinit(void)
  	}
  #endif