From 37850cdd54fd711c0a33fbdee14880b401ff7b26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Pavlinec <jan.pavlinec@nic.cz>
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 17:12:04 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] libarchive: patch multiple CVEs
Fixes
CVE-2018-1000880
CVE-2018-1000879
CVE-2018-1000878
CVE-2018-1000877
Signed-off-by: Jan Pavlinec <jan.pavlinec@nic.cz>
---
libs/libarchive/Makefile | 3 +-
.../patches/100-CVE-2018-1000880.patch | 37 ++++++++++
.../patches/101-CVE-2018-1000879.patch | 43 +++++++++++
.../patches/102-CVE-2018-1000878.patch | 72 +++++++++++++++++++
.../patches/103-CVE-2018-1000877.patch | 31 ++++++++
5 files changed, 185 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 libs/libarchive/patches/100-CVE-2018-1000880.patch
create mode 100644 libs/libarchive/patches/101-CVE-2018-1000879.patch
create mode 100644 libs/libarchive/patches/102-CVE-2018-1000878.patch
create mode 100644 libs/libarchive/patches/103-CVE-2018-1000877.patch
diff --git a/libs/libarchive/Makefile b/libs/libarchive/Makefile
index d4a9cdaad..cb72e9c2c 100644
--- a/libs/libarchive/Makefile
+++ b/libs/libarchive/Makefile
@@ -9,13 +9,14 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=libarchive
PKG_VERSION:=3.3.3
-PKG_RELEASE:=1
+PKG_RELEASE:=2
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.libarchive.org/downloads
PKG_HASH:=ba7eb1781c9fbbae178c4c6bad1c6eb08edab9a1496c64833d1715d022b30e2e
PKG_MAINTAINER:=Johannes Morgenroth <morgenroth@ibr.cs.tu-bs.de>
PKG_LICENSE:=BSD-2-Clause
+PKG_CPE_ID:=cpe:/a:libarchive:libarchive
PKG_INSTALL:=1
PKG_FIXUP:=autoreconf
diff --git a/libs/libarchive/patches/100-CVE-2018-1000880.patch b/libs/libarchive/patches/100-CVE-2018-1000880.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d9566ff9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libs/libarchive/patches/100-CVE-2018-1000880.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 9c84b7426660c09c18cc349f6d70b5f8168b5680 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 16:33:42 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] warc: consume data once read
+
+The warc decoder only used read ahead, it wouldn't actually consume
+data that had previously been printed. This means that if you specify
+an invalid content length, it will just reprint the same data over
+and over and over again until it hits the desired length.
+
+This means that a WARC resource with e.g.
+Content-Length: 666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666665
+but only a few hundred bytes of data, causes a quasi-infinite loop.
+
+Consume data in subsequent calls to _warc_read.
+
+Found with an AFL + afl-rb + qsym setup.
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c
+index e8753853f..e8fc8428b 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c
+@@ -386,6 +386,11 @@ _warc_read(struct archive_read *a, const void **buf, size_t *bsz, int64_t *off)
+ return (ARCHIVE_EOF);
+ }
+
++ if (w->unconsumed) {
++ __archive_read_consume(a, w->unconsumed);
++ w->unconsumed = 0U;
++ }
++
+ rab = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1U, &nrd);
+ if (nrd < 0) {
+ *bsz = 0U;
diff --git a/libs/libarchive/patches/101-CVE-2018-1000879.patch b/libs/libarchive/patches/101-CVE-2018-1000879.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ecd4da537
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libs/libarchive/patches/101-CVE-2018-1000879.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 15bf44fd2c1ad0e3fd87048b3fcc90c4dcff1175 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 14:29:42 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] Skip 0-length ACL fields
+
+Currently, it is possible to create an archive that crashes bsdtar
+with a malformed ACL:
+
+Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
+archive_acl_from_text_l (acl=<optimised out>, text=0x7e2e92 "", want_type=<optimised out>, sc=<optimised out>) at libarchive/archive_acl.c:1726
+1726 switch (*s) {
+(gdb) p n
+$1 = 1
+(gdb) p field[n]
+$2 = {start = 0x0, end = 0x0}
+
+Stop this by checking that the length is not zero before beginning
+the switch statement.
+
+I am pretty sure this is the bug mentioned in the qsym paper [1],
+and I was able to replicate it with a qsym + AFL + afl-rb setup.
+
+[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yun
+---
+ libarchive/archive_acl.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_acl.c b/libarchive/archive_acl.c
+index 512beee1f..7beeee86e 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_acl.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_acl.c
+@@ -1723,6 +1723,11 @@ archive_acl_from_text_l(struct archive_acl *acl, const char *text,
+ st = field[n].start + 1;
+ len = field[n].end - field[n].start;
+
++ if (len == 0) {
++ ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
++ continue;
++ }
++
+ switch (*s) {
+ case 'u':
+ if (len == 1 || (len == 4
diff --git a/libs/libarchive/patches/102-CVE-2018-1000878.patch b/libs/libarchive/patches/102-CVE-2018-1000878.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..df4896924
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libs/libarchive/patches/102-CVE-2018-1000878.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From bfcfe6f04ed20db2504db8a254d1f40a1d84eb28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 00:55:22 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] rar: file split across multi-part archives must match
+
+Fuzzing uncovered some UAF and memory overrun bugs where a file in a
+single file archive reported that it was split across multiple
+volumes. This was caused by ppmd7 operations calling
+rar_br_fillup. This would invoke rar_read_ahead, which would in some
+situations invoke archive_read_format_rar_read_header. That would
+check the new file name against the old file name, and if they didn't
+match up it would free the ppmd7 buffer and allocate a new
+one. However, because the ppmd7 decoder wasn't actually done with the
+buffer, it would continue to used the freed buffer. Both reads and
+writes to the freed region can be observed.
+
+This is quite tricky to solve: once the buffer has been freed it is
+too late, as the ppmd7 decoder functions almost universally assume
+success - there's no way for ppmd_read to signal error, nor are there
+good ways for functions like Range_Normalise to propagate them. So we
+can't detect after the fact that we're in an invalid state - e.g. by
+checking rar->cursor, we have to prevent ourselves from ever ending up
+there. So, when we are in the dangerous part or rar_read_ahead that
+assumes a valid split, we set a flag force read_header to either go
+down the path for split files or bail. This means that the ppmd7
+decoder keeps a valid buffer and just runs out of data.
+
+Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb and qsym.
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+index 6f419c270..a8cc5c94d 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ struct rar
+ struct data_block_offsets *dbo;
+ unsigned int cursor;
+ unsigned int nodes;
++ char filename_must_match;
+
+ /* LZSS members */
+ struct huffman_code maincode;
+@@ -1560,6 +1561,12 @@ read_header(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
++ else if (rar->filename_must_match)
++ {
++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
++ "Mismatch of file parts split across multi-volume archive");
++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++ }
+
+ rar->filename_save = (char*)realloc(rar->filename_save,
+ filename_size + 1);
+@@ -2933,12 +2940,14 @@ rar_read_ahead(struct archive_read *a, size_t min, ssize_t *avail)
+ else if (*avail == 0 && rar->main_flags & MHD_VOLUME &&
+ rar->file_flags & FHD_SPLIT_AFTER)
+ {
++ rar->filename_must_match = 1;
+ ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry);
+ if (ret == (ARCHIVE_EOF))
+ {
+ rar->has_endarc_header = 1;
+ ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry);
+ }
++ rar->filename_must_match = 0;
+ if (ret != (ARCHIVE_OK))
+ return NULL;
+ return rar_read_ahead(a, min, avail);
diff --git a/libs/libarchive/patches/103-CVE-2018-1000877.patch b/libs/libarchive/patches/103-CVE-2018-1000877.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7998b5583
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libs/libarchive/patches/103-CVE-2018-1000877.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 021efa522ad729ff0f5806c4ce53e4a6cc1daa31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 17:56:29 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid a double-free when a window size of 0 is specified
+
+new_size can be 0 with a malicious or corrupted RAR archive.
+
+realloc(area, 0) is equivalent to free(area), so the region would
+be free()d here and the free()d again in the cleanup function.
+
+Found with a setup running AFL, afl-rb, and qsym.
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+index 234522229..6f419c270 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+@@ -2300,6 +2300,11 @@ parse_codes(struct archive_read *a)
+ new_size = DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE;
+ else
+ new_size = rar_fls((unsigned int)rar->unp_size) << 1;
++ if (new_size == 0) {
++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
++ "Zero window size is invalid.");
++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++ }
+ new_window = realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size);
+ if (new_window == NULL) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,