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python-crypto: Fix two CVEs

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CVE-2013-7459 and CVE-2018-6594. Both patches taken from Fedora.

Also took the liberty to update the PKG_SOURCE_URL to a standard one.

Updated the home URL as well.

Signed-off-by: Rosen Penev <rosenp@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Rosen Penev 2018-08-26 21:12:54 -07:00
parent 8938517832
commit 32b23e28ad
3 changed files with 161 additions and 3 deletions
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7
lang/python/python-crypto/Makefile
View file

@ -9,16 +9,17 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=python-crypto
PKG_VERSION:=2.6.1
PKG_RELEASE:=2
PKG_RELEASE:=3
PKG_SOURCE:=pycrypto-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://ftp.dlitz.net/pub/dlitz/crypto/pycrypto/
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/p/pycrypto
PKG_HASH:=f2ce1e989b272cfcb677616763e0a2e7ec659effa67a88aa92b3a65528f60a3c
PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(BUILD_DIR)/$(BUILD_VARIANT)-crypto-$(PKG_VERSION)
PKG_LICENSE:=Public Domain
PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYRIGHT
PKG_CPE_ID:=cpe:/a:dlitz:pycrypto
PKG_MAINTAINER:=Jeffery To <jeffery.to@gmail.com>
include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package.mk
@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ define Package/python-crypto/Default
SECTION:=lang-python
CATEGORY:=Languages
SUBMENU:=Python
URL:=http://www.pycrypto.org/
URL:=https://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto/
endef
define Package/python-crypto

106
lang/python/python-crypto/patches/100-CVE-2013-74459.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
From 8dbe0dc3eea5c689d4f76b37b93fe216cf1f00d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Legrandin <helderijs@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 22 Dec 2013 22:24:46 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Throw exception when IV is used with ECB or CTR
The IV parameter is currently ignored when initializing
a cipher in ECB or CTR mode.
For CTR mode, it is confusing: it takes some time to see
that a different parameter is needed (the counter).
For ECB mode, it is outright dangerous.
This patch forces an exception to be raised.
---
lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
src/block_template.c | 11 +++++++++++
2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py b/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py
index 420b6ff..a5f8a88 100644
--- a/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py
+++ b/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py
@@ -239,16 +239,30 @@ class RoundtripTest(unittest.TestCase):
return """%s .decrypt() output of .encrypt() should not be garbled""" % (self.module_name,)
def runTest(self):
- for mode in (self.module.MODE_ECB, self.module.MODE_CBC, self.module.MODE_CFB, self.module.MODE_OFB, self.module.MODE_OPENPGP):
+
+ ## ECB mode
+ mode = self.module.MODE_ECB
+ encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode)
+ ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext)
+ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode)
+ decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
+ self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext)
+
+ ## OPENPGP mode
+ mode = self.module.MODE_OPENPGP
+ encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv)
+ eiv_ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext)
+ eiv = eiv_ciphertext[:self.module.block_size+2]
+ ciphertext = eiv_ciphertext[self.module.block_size+2:]
+ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, eiv)
+ decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
+ self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext)
+
+ ## All other non-AEAD modes (but CTR)
+ for mode in (self.module.MODE_CBC, self.module.MODE_CFB, self.module.MODE_OFB):
encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv)
ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext)
-
- if mode != self.module.MODE_OPENPGP:
- decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv)
- else:
- eiv = ciphertext[:self.module.block_size+2]
- ciphertext = ciphertext[self.module.block_size+2:]
- decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, eiv)
+ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv)
decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext)
diff --git a/src/block_template.c b/src/block_template.c
index f940e0e..d555ceb 100644
--- a/src/block_template.c
+++ b/src/block_template.c
@@ -170,6 +170,17 @@ ALGnew(PyObject *self, PyObject *args, PyObject *kwdict)
"Key cannot be the null string");
return NULL;
}
+ if (IVlen != 0 && mode == MODE_ECB)
+ {
+ PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError, "ECB mode does not use IV");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (IVlen != 0 && mode == MODE_CTR)
+ {
+ PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError,
+ "CTR mode needs counter parameter, not IV");
+ return NULL;
+ }
if (IVlen != BLOCK_SIZE && mode != MODE_ECB && mode != MODE_CTR)
{
PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError,
From 58de28a5d32bc10e15766e5a59f41b07397cc6cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Mitchell <richard.j.mitchell@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 16:58:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix speedtest run for ECB modes.
---
pct-speedtest.py | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/pct-speedtest.py b/pct-speedtest.py
index 4ce18be..c7b893a 100644
--- a/pct-speedtest.py
+++ b/pct-speedtest.py
@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ class Benchmark:
blocks = self.random_blocks(16384, 1000)
if mode is None:
cipher = module.new(key)
+ elif mode==module.MODE_ECB:
+ cipher = module.new(key, module.MODE_ECB)
else:
cipher = module.new(key, mode, iv)

51
lang/python/python-crypto/patches/101-CVE-2018-6594.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
--- lib/Crypto/PublicKey/ElGamal.py
+++ lib/Crypto/PublicKey/ElGamal.py
@@ -153,33 +153,33 @@ def generate(bits, randfunc, progress_fu
if number.isPrime(obj.p, randfunc=randfunc):
break
# Generate generator g
- # See Algorithm 4.80 in Handbook of Applied Cryptography
- # Note that the order of the group is n=p-1=2q, where q is prime
if progress_func:
progress_func('g\n')
while 1:
+ # Choose a square residue; it will generate a cyclic group of order q.
+ obj.g = pow(number.getRandomRange(2, obj.p, randfunc), 2, obj.p)
+
# We must avoid g=2 because of Bleichenbacher's attack described
# in "Generating ElGamal signatures without knowning the secret key",
# 1996
- #
- obj.g = number.getRandomRange(3, obj.p, randfunc)
- safe = 1
- if pow(obj.g, 2, obj.p)==1:
- safe=0
- if safe and pow(obj.g, q, obj.p)==1:
- safe=0
+ if obj.g in (1, 2):
+ continue
+
# Discard g if it divides p-1 because of the attack described
# in Note 11.67 (iii) in HAC
- if safe and divmod(obj.p-1, obj.g)[1]==0:
- safe=0
+ if (obj.p - 1) % obj.g == 0:
+ continue
+
# g^{-1} must not divide p-1 because of Khadir's attack
# described in "Conditions of the generator for forging ElGamal
# signature", 2011
ginv = number.inverse(obj.g, obj.p)
- if safe and divmod(obj.p-1, ginv)[1]==0:
- safe=0
- if safe:
- break
+ if (obj.p - 1) % ginv == 0:
+ continue
+
+ # Found
+ break
+
# Generate private key x
if progress_func:
progress_func('x\n')